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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Public-private partnerships (PPP) allow involvement of private parties in the provision 
of public goods. How does this differ from traditional public procurement? We view PPPs as 
collaborative projects with information frictions. Typical public procurement contracts tackle the 
problems of asymmetric information. However, not all projects are contractible; some are not 
profitable enough to ensure participation of the private partner. This is due, in part, to costly 
information verification, and in part to the profitability requirements of the private party. We 
demonstrate what specific features of a partnership can improve feasibility of projects, and thus 
both provide a justification of PPP as a form of public good provision, and demonstrate how and 
whether it differs from procurement. We then analyse real life examples of PPP projects from the 
perspective of optimal choice of contracts, involvement of both partners, and the features that 
make these PPP arrangements superior to public procurement. 
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1. Introduction 
Public-private partnerships (PPP) are a popular form of provision of public goods 
jointly by the state (municipal) bodies and private entrepreneurs. Many definitions are in use, 
whose focus ranges from legal covenants and regulatory framework to business risks and social 
benefits (see, e.g., a review by Hodge and Greve, 2007). Opinions on the societal role of PPP 
range from extremely positive (Lattemann et al., 2009) through moderately critical (Regan et al., 
2011) to explicitly negative ones (Coulson, 2005; Siemiatycki, 2011; da Cruz et al., 2013). From 
the business organization perspectives, PPPs are considered along public provision of services, 
outsourcing (contracting out) and privatization (Joha and Janssen, 2010, consider either public 
party, private party or jointly public and private parties carrying the responsibility for the public 
good provision; Stiglitz (2002) views PPP along privatization and contracting out.). As 
emphasized by Stiglitz (2002), the main question is what role should be left to the government. 
In this paper we explicitly study the role of the public party in a PPP, and analyse under which 
conditions a PPP is socially beneficial, which provides a uniform framework able to 
accommodate the variety of views above. 
Formal analysis of PPP usually resorts to contract theory. One of the issues, rather well 
studied in the literature, is whether some or all tasks within one, typically infrastructure, project 
should be delegated to a private partner (Bennett and Iossa, 2006; Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; 
Maskin and Tirole, 2008; Chen and Chiu, 2010). Such an "unbundling" view neglects 
contributions by the partners that cannot be defined as a part of the project, for example, 
improvements in efficiency due to knowledge spillovers through collaboration. Differently, this 
paper approaches PPP from the perspective of the theory of contracting for collaborative projects 
(Roels et al., 2010; Kim and Netessine, 2013; Roels, 2014) to identify the specific advantages 
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brought by a partnership as compared to contracting out and other forms of collaboration 
between the public and the private sector. 
We view PPP as a form of business organization with two specific features: 
consolidation of private and public resources (consolidated enterprise), and facilitation of 
co-production through improved communication and other uncontactable benefits. Although we 
derive the latter property endogenously as a condition for an improvement in the feasibility of 
socially desirable projects, it conveniently relates to the "partnership" element of the PPP. The 
interpretation of the term "partnership" varies in the literature (and across disciplines), still most 
authors would agree that a partnership involves "the closest possible cooperation" (this definition 
of a "partnership principle" is extensively used in the EU integration policy documents, see e.g. 
Allen et al., 2005, p.218; Dahl et al., 2014), agreement on objectives (Brinkerhoff, 2002) and 
different degrees of formality, "ranging from informal, oral understandings to formal 
agreements" (Erhard and Brigham, 2006, p.4). These three properties suffice to improve 
feasibility of projects, as compared to typical contracts in presence of information frictions. 
Information frictions imply welfare losses due to verification costs. Roels et al. (2010) 
study the problem of contracting for collaborative services under asymmetric information. They 
derive optimal types of contracts depending on the elasticity of project outcomes to contributions 
of the collaborating parties. An important implication of their model is that there exists a set of 
projects that cannot be implemented because the net profit from them does not cover the 
reservation utility of the service supplier. Although contract design in public-private projects 
differs from that in collaborative services, particularly in terms of incentives and liabilities of the 
parties, the main implications are the same. Yet, a close cooperation with aligned partners' 
objectives, may reduce information cost and lower the reservation utility, which makes more 
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projects implementable through a consolidated public-private enterprise if the partnership 
principle holds. 
PPP are thus justified only if (1) a public good cannot be provided by the public sector 
alone, (2) the system of public procurement fails to ensure the provision of the public good by 
commissioning it to a private business, and (3) both the public and the private sectors possess 
comparative advantages in the provision of some resources indispensable for the delivery of the 
public good. The partnership element ensures a reduction in the reservation utility of the private 
partner and removal of the (part of) verification costs. To clarify and test the theory, we 
investigate several cases of real-life PPP projects, with the focus on the combination of the 
public and private resources, identification of comparative advantages of the partners, and the 
types of contracts chosen to enable the partnership in each of the cases. We also specify the 
real-life arrangements that correspond to the partnership principle above. 
Based on the theoretical and case-study analysis, our main conclusion is that the 
"partnership" is indeed an indispensable element that justifies PPP from a social welfare 
perspective. The forms, in which the partnership principle is implemented, can vary. Institutional 
arrangements that facilitate the projects that private businesses run with the public sector, 
exemplify implicit provisions that embody the partnership element. Explicit provisions would 
include special clauses in the contract. Typically, such a clause would specify the role of the 
public partner after the procurement stage, for example in what refers to risk sharing or possible 
modification/variation of the project specification. It follows that in countries with a developed 
institutional structure that supports private-public cooperation, the benefits of the partnership are 
available to any consolidated private-public enterprise, which is then rightfully seen as a PPP. In 
others, special provisions are needed to ensure efficiency gains and to provide a clear distinction 
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between PPP and other forms of public-private interaction. 
 
2. Consolidation of resources and partnership 
Traditionally, public goods are provided by the state, yet this is often criticized for 
inefficiencies. The state can exploit the efficiency benefits of private business when outsourcing 
the provision of public goods. With application to the public sector, outsourcing is the delegation 
of public good provision by the state to an external producer (private business). This gives rise to 
various outsourcing strategies, depending on how much control would the state exercise over the 
outsourced business. On the one extreme there is outsourcing to free competitive businesses 
subject to no more than usual business regulation as applied to all other non-public goods 
producers. Among other forms, this includes contracting and privatization, which can be seen as, 
respectively, a sporadic or permanent delegation of the public good provision to the private 
sector (note that so far this view does not imply anything for the terms and conditions of such a 
deal between the state and the private business). Another extreme would involve special 
regulatory provisions such as price (tariff) regulation or even regular monitoring and audit of the 
outsourced businesses. Price regulation is sometimes seen as a distinctive feature that allows 
distinguishing between public and private sectors (Broadbent and Laughin 2003). However these 
forms might be inefficient as well as regulation can limit efficiency, whereas monitoring and 
audit are costly. 
A consolidated public-private enterprise can only be justified if it overcomes the 
inefficiencies generated by the above-mentioned forms. In order to define a public-private 
partnership, we need to formulate the following partnership principle: each party is interested in 
the overall success of the enterprise as well as in the success of the other counterparts. This 
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principle is consonant with the definition of partnership by Brinkerhoff (2002) who stresses that 
partners mutually agree on their objectives and rationally divide labour on the respective 
comparative advantages of each partner. Our focus on partnership is important because (a) 
surprisingly, there is no clear definition of partnership in the PPP literature, although some 
definitions of PPP explicitly mention true partnership as a criterion, see definition iv, (b) 
partnership is often confused with cooperation or collaboration (partnership principle is 
commonly used in the policy documents on EU integration to denote the closest possible 
collaboration), and (c) consolidation of resources does not necessarily imply partnership as 
defined above. In fact, the existing PPP literature does not emphasize the term partnership per se, 
with rare exceptions (Roumboutsos and Chiara 2010).
1
 A consolidated public-private enterprise 
without a partnership principle can be justified, for example, if the state wishes to enjoy the 
benefits that would otherwise be delivered through privatization (i.e. the benefits of a free 
competitive business environment) but for political or strategic reasons does not wish to 
privatize. In such a case a consolidation of resources is possible through a [subsidized] lease 
agreement but otherwise there is no distinction between such a consolidated enterprise and a 
                                                          
1
In corporate finance a partnership is known as an association "to conduct a noncorporate 
business", as in Erhardt and Brigham (2006, p.4). They elaborate on this definition further to 
stress that "partnerships may operate under different degrees of formality, ranging from informal, 
oral understandings to formal agreements filed with the secretary of the state in which the 
partnership was formed. The major advantage of a partnership is its low cost and ease of 
formation. The disadvantages are... (1) unlimited liability, (2) limited life of the organization, (3) 
difficulty transferring ownership, and (4) difficulty raising large amounts of capital.... under 
partnership law, each partner is liable for the business's debts". This is in line with our 
"partnership principle" as unlimited liability of both partners creates incentives to care about the 
ability of the other partner to meet obligations. Yet when the "other partner" is the state, 
"unlimited liability" does not seem to work the same way. Therefore we explicitly require that 
both partners are concerned about the overall success of the project. 
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usual private business. By ruling out these cases we arrive at the following definition of a PPP: a 
public-private partnership is a consolidated public-private enterprise that adheres to the 
partnership principle. 
This definition yields most known properties of PPP. Social importance of PPP follows 
from the fact that public funds are engaged, which can only be justified if they are used to 
produce public goods. A formal legal agreement is needed to establish such an enterprise and to 
specify the way in which resources (physical assets, knowledge or labor) are consolidated. The 
partnership principle ensures risk sharing: all counterparts have incentives to take on risks which 
they can most effectively manage and delegate the management of other risks to the other parties 
who have their comparative risk management advantages. Compared to the properties of PPP 
formulated in the introduction, the above definition only fails to directly incorporate the 
competitive choice of PPP partners by the state and the size and the length of the project. 
Whereas the former seems rather an important technical procedure that provides the best match 
of partners to ensure the partnership principle, the latter does not arise as a pre-requisite for a 
PPP. We address this issue in the following section. 
The above definition of PPP from the business organization perspective provides a 
sought precise boundary surrounding PPP and in particular supports the commonly accepted 
view that PPPs are the main alternative to contracting out and privatization (Hodge and Greve 
2007). It shares with other studies the classification according to the extent that the tasks, risks 
and responsibilities of former public service provision are transferred to the private partner 
(Koppenjan and Enserink 2009), but this classification is now a natural consequence of a more 
general view on the forms of business organization suitable for the provision of public goods. It 
also follows that a PPP is desirable when production costs are high (this rules out autarchy), 
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market barriers prevent free entry (this rules out competitive private business), and monitoring 
and audit is costly or inefficient (this rules out public and controlled enterprises). PPPs are 
distinguished from other forms of private sector participation in the provision of public goods by 
two criteria: consolidation of resources and partnership principle, as summarized in Table 2. This 
distinction is operational and useful for empirical studies of PPP. By focusing on financial 
resources only as one dimension and organizational relationship as the other dimension, Hodge 
and Greve (2007) provide a further distinction between different PPPs. They also refer to 
Brinkerhoff (2002) to note that the mutuality, i.e. interdependence and equality in 
decision-making as well as equal benefits to parties constitutes another important dimension. The 
latter broadly corresponds to our partnership principle. 
 
Table 2. A typology of forms of public goods provision based on consolidation of 
resources and partnership principle. 
 
 
Partnership principle 
+ – 
Consolidation of 
resources 
+ PPP 
Outsourcing on lease, 
Contracting 
– Contracting 
Privatization 
Public enterprise 
 
 
In the remainder of the paper we focus on the forms of business organization presented 
in Table 2 in the following order. We first formally show when a collaboration between the 
private and the public sector is desirable, thus ruling out privatization and nationalization. 
Subsequently, we focus on the consolidation of resources to study the feasibility of the 
public-private projects under typical contractual agreements. Then we turn to the partnership 
principle on top of the consolidation of resources. This allows us to study the benefits that can 
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arise from the partnership, and more importantly, to formally specify the elements of the 
partnership principle and to derive conditions when these are socially beneficial. We further 
discuss whether a project that adheres to the partnership principle but does not involve a 
consolidation of resources, makes sense from the perspective of social welfare. 
3. Optimal contract 
The above discussion contrasts PPP and other types of public good provision that 
involve private sector, along two dimensions: consolidation of resources and partnership. 
Consolidation of resources reduces the overall cost of their provision, if each party supplies 
resources which it can obtain at a lower cost than any other counterpart. On the other hand, 
consolidation of resources requires collaboration, which may be costly, for example due to the 
need to coordinate actions, or to monitor the actions/contribution of the partner. If the cost of 
collaboration does not exceed the savings achieved through the reduction in the overall cost of 
resources, consolidation and collaboration offer cost-efficiency. In this section we assume that 
the public and the private partner collaborate on a joint project. Depending on the information 
and other costs, such a collaboration will not always be optimal, and hence some projects will be 
unfeasible. We will further demonstrate the benefits of the partnership that can improve the 
feasibility of the projects. 
Our setup is similar to the basic model of contracting for collaborative services 
suggested by Roels et al. (2010). Their focus is on the co-production between the vendor and the 
buyer of the service. Involvement of the buyer improves the value of the service, which acts as 
an incentive for the buyer to co-produce. The main issues that arise with regards to services, are 
the verifiability of the vendor's and the buyer's inputs, as well as the uncertainty of the value the 
buyer will derive from the service. With regards to typical public goods, their value is rather 
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deterministic; in most cases they are linked to material objects (buildings, infrastructure, 
facilities etc.). For this reason our focus is mainly on the structure of incentives, which differs 
from that implementable in services. In particular, inputs are usually verifiable, yet the costs of 
their verification may differ, implying different types of optimal contractual arrangements for 
different projects. 
3.1. Consolidation of resources 
Consider a project that requires two [sets of] inputs denoted by x  for the contribution 
of the public party and y  for that of the private party, and generates a (social) value of  yxV , . 
The costs of inputs are  xcx  and  ycy  respectively, increasing in their argument. Denote 
with U  the reservation utility, i.e. the lowest payoff that the private partner prefers to the 
outside option of not entering the project. If the project is run by the private partner only, it does 
not generate enough profit to cover U , otherwise we would deem the project implementable 
through the private sector. The involvement of the public party is justified by its ability to 
provide resource x  at a lower cost than faced by the private partner. 
Theoretically, both partners can provide any resources, although literature usually 
underlines efficiency gains expected from a collaboration of a public body with a private partner, 
suggesting managerial skills as one of the sought private resources. To provide an example that 
informs our model, the cost advantage of the private partner could refer to labour and material 
cost, as well as to the cost of intellectual capital and efficient management, all of which are 
denoted as a single set of resources y  in our setup. One can think of y  as a single package of 
inputs, and ycy   as the total price of it; in a similar way, a typical lot in a public procurement 
auction or tender would specify the whole package to be purchased, leaving the decision with 
regards to the resources actually needed for its provision, to the bidders. The total cost of 
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providing resources y  is distinct from the total payoff t  to the private partner; the latter also 
needs to cover the reservation utility and in general depends on the type of contract chosen. 
The cost advantage of the public partner would refer, for example, to capital resources 
(such as land), knowledge and information, as well as the specific ability of the public partner to 
reduce the "red tape" (cost of compliance and bureaucratic procedures associated with the 
project). For more discussion, examples and relevant references see Vinogradov et al. (2014). 
3.2. Contract design 
Parties contractually agree to deliver inputs x  and y  as optimally chosen for the 
particular project. The public party can verify the input of the private partner at cost  yy . 
Similarly, the public party may be required to report on the delivery of the agreed input x , 
which incurs information (reporting) cost  xx . This latter cost may be associated with a need 
to provide hard evidence in the court of law upon a request by the private partner. This setup 
leaves all information costs with the public party. Redistributing them between the partners will 
not affect the final result, as whenever the private partner bears information costs, these are 
included in the remuneration t . 
If any of the parties provides less resources than contractually agreed, they are subject 
to penalties: R  for the private partner and G  for the public party. Penalty can be 
non-pecuniary, associated with the loss of reputation and foregone future profit opportunities. 
We assume that R  is limited by the value of physical assets that belong to the private partner 
(bankruptcy value), and G  is also bounded from above, GG  . The harshest penalty that can 
be imposed on a public partner is the exhaustion of their reserves and the dismissal of the 
relevant public managers. A recent example of a penalty paid by a public partner as a monetary 
transfer to the private party would be £30m paid by the Norfolk County Council to Cory 
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Wheelabrator Consortium for abandoning the the Willows incinerator project at King's Lynn in 
the UK.
2
 In terms of our model, this corresponds to the event "project not delivered in full", with 
the public party delivering less resources than agreed. The specific "resource" in question here is 
the approval of the project going ahead and securing the state funding for it (the main reason for 
abandoning the project were 92% local citizens voting against the project and the subsequent 
withdrawal of the £169m government grant). The penalty for the council splits into £19m from 
current reserves and £11m from future savings, implying a longer lasting burden for other local 
project and a reputation damage. 
The contract is designed by choosing public and private inputs x  and y , 
remuneration 
t
, and the verification mode. For the latter we introduce binary variables x  and 
y  which take a value of 1 if it is the public or the private partner's input respectively that the 
parties agree to verify. Insufficient delivery of the verifiable input triggers penalty sanctions, 
hence information disclosure coupled with the penalty is reflected in the liabilities of the parties 
in a typical contract. It is usually costless to include liabilities of both parties in a paper 
document. Given this, the choice of x  and y  in our model can be seen as establishing firm 
beliefs of the parties with regards to who of them will actually be monitored or should credibly 
report on inputs provided. 
It is further assumed that the actual value of the project  yxV ,  is freely observable by 
both parties. Three types of contract are concievable: if either 1x  and 0y , or 0x  
                                                          
2
See, e.g. the BBC report 0f 31 March 2014: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-norfolk-26820542. 
 
 
14 
 
and 1y , only public or private input respectively is verified; with 0 yx   neither input 
is verfied. A contract with 1 yx   is suboptimal since knowing  yxV ,  and one of the 
inputs reveals the other input at no cost. The latter emphasises, in particular, that mistrust 
between the parties, that results in their beliefs that there is a need to monitor actions of each 
other, leads to a suboptimal outcome, as in equilibrium less resources will be provided in total, 
yielding a lower value of the project. The payoff to the private party thus depends on the inputs, 
the output and the verification mode:  yxVyxtt  ,,,, . The public partner then solves the 
following: 
           yxyxyyxxx
yx
yxVyxtyxxcyxV
yx


,,,,,,,, max
,,,
  (1) 
     ,,,,,       s.t. UycVyxt yyx   (IR)  
    ,ycycR yy    (IC-P) 
    ,xcxcG xx    (IC-G) 
  yxyxyx  ,,,maxarg,    
Here the individual rationality constraint (IR) ensures that the private partner is 
compensated enough to cover the cost of resources and the reservation utility, and incentive 
compatibility (IC) constraints (IC-P and IC-G) ensure that neither of the parties have incentives 
to deviate from the agreed contributions: penalties exceed any potential savings from deviations. 
 
Proposition 1. If there exists a mechanism that reveals   Uyct y    then an optimal 
contract with verification of the private input ( 0x , 1y ) sets the remuneration to the 
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private partner at  








.if
,if0
1,0,,,
yyt
yy
Vyxt  
PROOF: Setting   Uyct y    ensures IR is met (binding) in the optimum. IC-P is 
met if         0max yyyy cycycycR    since y  is known, yc  increases in y , and 
0y . Since yc  is unknown we can use inequality      0yyy cycUyc    to set  tR  to 
meet IC-P. The resulting payoff, if the contract is violated, is then 0  ttt . QED 
 
Even if y  is verifable, the cost function yc  and the reservation utility U  are not. For 
this reason, the above proposition assumes that   Uyct y    is known. This requires a price 
revelation mechanism when designing the contract, for example a bidding/auction or a tendering 
phase. The penalty on the public partner in this case does not play any role, as it is the input of 
the private party that is verified. This type of contracts is input-contingent (IC-contract) and 
encompasses various agreements where the private party is paid either on the hourly basis or 
exactly for the specified contribution to the overall project, yet not conditioned on the success of 
the project as a whole. 
Proposition 2. If there exists a mechanism that reveals   Uyct y   then an optimal 
contract that obliges the public partner to disclose and verify information about its inputs ( 1x , 
0y ), sets the remuneration to the private partner at 
  
 
 












,if
,, and if
,, and if0
,
xxGt
yxVVxxt
yxVVxx
Vxt  
and penalty G  on the public partner at    .0xx cxcGG     
16 
 
PROOF: If  xx  and   yxVV ,  then necessarily  yy . If  xx  and 
  yxVV ,  then necessarily  yy . For these two cases the proof is the same as for 
proposition 1. As the private partner has no incentives to provide more than y , the equilibrium 
provision is  yy . In equilibrium  xx  as the public party has incentives to reduce costs 
 xcx . For this reason setting  
 tVxt ,  if  xx  and   yxVV ,  is optimal. If  xx , 
then necessarily   yxVV ,  as the private partner provides only  yy  in equilibrium. The 
input of the private party cannot be verified but transferring penalty to the private party is the 
cheapest mechanism to ensure the private party is convinced the public party has been penalised. 
For the same reasons as in the proof of proposition 1, the level of the penalty should be set at 
   0xx cxcG   , but the cost function xc  cannot be credibly reported to the private party, 
therefore G  is set at the highest possible level to ensure that IC-G is met. QED 
 
In our model, there is no specific mechanism to determine the optimal penalty on the 
public partner. Paying the private partner t  compensates for foregone profits, independent of 
how much resources were actually delivered, however this may be insufficient to meet IC-G. The 
transfer of G  to the private party is the cheapest available mechanism to ensure that the private 
party is convinced the penalty was actually imposed. This type of contracts is output-contingent 
(OC-contract), and as follows from the proposition, it is indispensable that if the public party 
conditions payoffs to the private side on the success of the overall project, the public party itself 
should be accountable and provide credible information about its inputs. This would also require 
that all inputs of the public party are clearly specified in the contract. In both cases with input 
verification, the contract presumes a fee that is fixed at the moment of signing the contract: the 
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amount   Uyct y    is the agreed compensation for the inputs, plus the premium to cover the 
reservation utility. 
 
Proposition 3. A contract that does not require verification of inputs specifies the 
payoff to the private partner by a bonus rate 0b  and a fixed fee of Us  : .sbVt   
PROOF: If inputs are not verified, parties face double moral hazard, in which case the 
optimal (second-best) contract is as above, see, e.g., Bhattacharya and Lafontaine (1995). It only 
remains to establish that Us  . Neither s , nor U  are known to the public party, both are a 
part of remuneration to the private party, determined at the negotiation stage. In the limit, with 
zero private contribution and zero outcome, the payoff to the private party is exactly the 
surcharge (premium) it requires for taking part in the collaborative project, even if no further 
effort is required. In the fixed-fee contracts such a surcharge equals to U  (see propositions 1 
and 2) and in the PB-contract it equals to s . As both denote the same participation premium, 
which does not depend on the type of the contract, we obtain Us  . QED 
 
The contract in the last proposition is performance-based (PB-contract). Roels et al. 
(2010) discuss properties of the optimal bonus rate b  in the context of co-production in 
services. In the context of public-private projects, the emphasis is on the possibility to link the 
remuneration to the private party to the social value generated by the project. Concession is one 
example: the private party operates an infrastructure object and derives profit from payments by 
the end users. In this case, the higher the social value of the object, the more intensively it is 
used, and the higher is the payoff to the private party. 
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3.3. Choice of contract and feasibility 
A project is feasible if parties agree to implement it by entering one of the above 
contractual agreements. This requires that the social value V  generated exceeds costs 
(including verification costs) and the reservation utility of the private partner. The choice of the 
optimal contract is based on the comparison of the total surplus they generate. To do this, from 
this point on assume that    yxyxV , ,   xcxc xx  ,   ycyc yy   (this assumption is 
identical to Roels et al., 2010) and that   xx xx   and   yy yy   (this assumes that the 
cost of input verification is linear in the input, and it does not cost a penny to reveal that one of 
the parties did not contribute anything). With this in mind, for fixed parameters x  and y  
that determine the type of the contract, re-write (1), substituting for     UycVyxt yyx  ,,,, , 
to obtain  
    Uycxcyx yyyxxx
yx
   max
,
 (2) 
This holds for both types of fixed-fee contracts. Maximisation of this 
Cobb-Douglas-type function is a standard exercise, with first-order conditions ensuring 
   xcV xxx   and    ycV yyy   for the optimal combination of outputs x  
and y . This allows one to re-write the objective function as 
        Uyx yxyxyxFF    ,,1, , where  yxx  ,  and  yxy  ,  are 
optimally chosen for the given type of contract  yx  ,  (asterisk dropped to improve 
readability). From here one straightforwardly obtains that    1,00,1 FFFF   if and only if 
          0,1/1,01,0/0,1 yyxx  . In this notation  0,1x  is the optimal public input in the OC 
contract, and  1,0x  in the IC-contract (similarly for  1,0y  and  0,1y ). Ratio 
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    11,0/0,1 xx  measures the effect of the contract choice on the amount of public resource 
contracted (a requirement to verify input x  makes it more expensive than without verification, 
for which reason, ceteris paribus,    1,00,1 xx  ); similarly for input y . It follows that if 
resources of both parties have identical provision and verification costs, it is the sensitivity of the 
project to these resources that determines the type of the contract: OC-contract is preferred to 
IC-contract if and only if   . This is because, for example, choosing a contract that incurs 
verification cost for resource x  reduces the optimal amount of this resource that will be 
contracted for the project (due to higher cost), which affects the final value of the project, yet the 
impact is smaller if the project has lower sensitivity to this resource. The following proposition 
establishes the result more generally. 
Proposition 4. The fixed-fee contract contingent on output (OC) dominates the 
fixed-fee contract contingent on the private party's inputs (IC) if and only if 
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PROOF: Standard maximisation of the profit generated by the Cobb-Douglas 
production technology  yx  with factor costs as above, yields factor demands 
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As discussed above, comparing the values of the objective function for contracts OC 
20 
 
and IC is equivalent to the comparison of     1,0/0,1 xx  and     0,1/1,0 yy . Substitution 
yields the first result. By taking logarithms of both sides and re-arranging, we obtain the 
equivalent representation. QED 
 
It follows that the decisive criteria for the choice between OC and IC contracts are the 
factor elasticities   and  , and the cost of information verification relative to the factor costs, 
xx c/  and yy c/ . For example, a complex bridge would incur higher cost of resources (per 
unit) than a road because a bridge would involve many rather unique solutions, while 
constructing a road involves a repetition of rather standard approaches. At the same time, it is 
easier to verify the quality of the bridge and the resources actually used by parties, as it is one 
localised object, while it is more expensive to monitor the actual provision of resources at each 
kilometer of the road. For these reasons, the c/  ratio is expected to be lower for the bridge 
and higher for the road. The higher the sensitivity of the project to the private input, or the higher 
is the relative verification cost for the private input, the more likely is the OC-contract to 
dominate the IC-arrangement. 
The following proposition compares the benefits from fixed-fee contracts with those 
from the PB-contract. 
 
 Proposition 4. Performance-based contract dominates fixed-fee contracts if and only if 
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PROOF: The optimisation task differs from that under fixed-fee contracts as the 
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objective function of the public party   sxcyxb x 
1  does not depend on the costs of 
provision of y , and therefore the public party chooses x  for any given level of private input. 
The private party separately maximises profit Usycyxb y 
  for any given level of 
public input x . The first-order conditions thus turn into   xcyxb 
  11  and 
ycyxb 
1  respectively. The value of the objective function in the optimum is thus 
     syxbPB 
110,0 , and the factor demands are: 
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which delivers the result. Similarly for the IC-contract. QED 
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By the above proposition, performance-based contracts with the bonus rate b  offer 
maximum advantages as this maximises the term    bb  11  on the left-hand side. In Roels et 
al. (2010), PB-contracts are found optimal for projects with   , for which the bonus rate 
should be optimally set at around 50%. For 1  , the two results coincide, yet our result is 
not based on the optimal bonus rate. Instead, it claims that the PB-contract is more likely to 
dominate IC and OC contracts, if the optimal bonus rate is close to b ; other rates can be 
optimal for projects with different   and  , yet these would be less likely to dominate IC and 
OC contracts. The concession example above stresses that the bonus rate in public-private 
projects is effectively determined by the stream of income generated by the project over years. In 
this case our result stresses that the private party's share in this stream should depend on the 
sensitivity of the project outcome. The effect of a variation in b  on the optimality of 
performance-based contract is highlighted in figure 1. In particular, an increase in the bonus rate, 
although improving incentives for the private partner, does not necessarily imply a better overall 
performance of the project as compared to the same project run under a fixed-fee contract. 
 
 
Figure 1. Comparative statics for optimal PB-contract: bonus rate effect. For projects  
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   yxyxV , , the dark area is the set of parameters   , , for which a performance-based 
contract with  3.0,5.0b   and  7.0   dominates fixed-fee contracts if production costs are  
1.0 yx cc   and information costs are  1.0 yx  . 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparative statics for optimal PB-contract: costs effect. For projects  
   yxyxV , , the dark area is the set of parameters   , , for which a performance-based 
contract with 5.0b  dominates fixed-fee contracts if production costs are  
01.0,1.0 ccc yx  and 2.0 , and information costs are  1.0 yx  . 
 
 
  
Figure 3. Comparative statics for optimal PB-contract: information costs effect. For projects  
   yxyxV , , the dark area is the set of parameters   , , for which a performance-based 
contract with 5.0b  dominates fixed-fee contracts if production costs are  1.0 ccc yx   
and information costs are 075.0,1.0 yx   and 3.0 . 
Similarly, figures 2 and 3 show the effects of production and information costs on the 
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optimality of the performance-based contract. With higher information costs, the 
performance-based contract is more likely to dominate the fixed-fee contracts, which is 
intuitively clear because the cost of verification/reporting is a welfare loss that can be avoided 
with a performance-based contract. Interestingly, the cheaper the production, the larger the set of 
projects for which a performance-based contract dominates fixed-fee contracts (for 0 yx cc , 
the performance-based contract always dominates). This is due to the effect of the relative 
information cost: a decrease in the production cost makes verification/reporting relatively more 
expensive, and hence fixed-fee contracts less attractive. 
 
3.4. Role for partnership 
Not all projects are feasible even if contracts are optimally designed. If the total surplus 
from the optimal contract is below U  then it is impossible to contract the private party, and 
thus the project is deemed infeasible. The set of these projects is shown in Fig. Fig. Infeasible 
projects. Note that these projects can still be socially desirable. 
 
Figure 4. Infeasible projects. For projects     yxyxV , , the dark area is the set of 
parameters    , , for which the maximum profit generated through optimal contracts does not 
suffice to cover the reservation utility of the private partner U . 
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Two properties are remarkable in figure 4: (1) a reduction in the reservation utility 
shrinks the set of infeasible projects, and (2) cost reduction has a similar effect. In the figure, the 
bonus rate is set at 5.0b , consistent with the optimal level for performance-based contracts in 
Roels et al. (2010). As this is close to the optimal rate, the feasibility of the projects via 
contracting cannot be improved by changing the bonus. If partnerships offer advantages in terms 
of a reduction of information costs, production costs, or the reservation utility, this will improve 
feasibility of projects. 
For example, the public partner can provide guarantees to improve the chances of the 
private partner to obtain finance from the financial sector. These guarantees may be implicit, as 
the private partner is paid by the public one, yet they may improve the creditworthiness of the 
private partner, who would be able to obtain funding at a lower cost. This can, however, work in 
the opposite direction, if the public partner itself suffers from an insufficient funding and is thus 
regarded as unreliable. 
As another example, in 2000, in the UK HM Treasury and the private businesses (with 
the public partner owning 51% of the enterprise) established jointly Partnerships UK, the PPP 
aimed at a provision of consulting to the public and private parties that consider forming a PPP 
themselves. Partnerships UK dissolved in 2011, with its activities replaced in part by the 
Treasury (through its infrastructure projects department, Infrastructure UK) and another PPP, 
Local Partnerships, aimed at assisting the projects with local governments. A help of this type in 
the formation of new businesses, exemplifies yet another contribution of the public sector that 
does not explicitly enter contractual agreements, yet has an effect on the reservation utility, and 
hence on the feasibility of the projects. 
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The comparative statics in figure 4 can be formalized by considering a reduction of the 
reporting/verification cost, x
PPP
x   , or y
PPP
y    and a decrease in the reservation utility of 
the private partner, UU PPP   arising through an intensive collaboration with the public partner. 
Denote with j  the profit resulting from a project contracted through a fixed-fee ( FFj  ) or a 
performance-based ( PBj  ) contract, and PPPj  –profit from a similar project within a similar 
contract but with special provisions ensuring the above reduction in costs and reservation utility. 
 Proposition 5. If the partnership ensures that either of the following holds: (1) 
UU PPP  , (2) x
PPP
x   , or (3) y
PPP
y   , then there exist projects   ,  unfeasible under 
standard contractual arrangements but feasible under the partnership: 
     UU jPPPj  max:,max:,  . 
PROOF: It is easy to check that  PPP  and UU PPP   ensure 
j
PPP
j  maxmax  for any   and  . The rest follows from U
PPP
jj  maxmax  : all 
elements of the first set are also elements of the second one, but not vice versa.The proof follows 
from UU PPPPPPjj  maxmax , which holds for any   and  . 
 
The reservation utility can be viewed as the sunk cost plus a premium (the difference 
between the actual remuneration and the actual costs to provide the required input) that the 
private party requires to take part in the project. The sunk cost, for example, would include the 
startup cost, the application cost, the cost of overcoming bureaucratic obstacles, etc. (not to 
mention bribery). The premium is a compensation for potential inconveniencies of dealing with 
the public body (e.g. due to internal inefficiencies, delays in decisions, need to adhere to multiple 
requirements and codes of best practice, etc., all of which is usually referred to as red tape). In a 
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partnership, the sunk cost decreases because of the cost advantage of the public partner, and the 
premium decreases because of the improved incentives of the public partner. Not the least, one 
of the reasons for the premium to decrease is in the potential reputation gains for the private 
partner. 
The reduction in information cost can be due to co-production: the closer the 
collaboration, the more obvious is the input of the counterpart. Co-production is often associated 
with knowledge spillovers, and observed, for example, in knowledge-intensive services 
(Doroshenko and Vinogradov, 2011), yet parties should be willing to closely co-produce and be 
open to exchange knowledge. These two conditions are less unlikely to be contractible. Besides, 
public bodies are known to be involved in the co-production to a lesser degree than private firms, 
at least in what regards knowledge-intensive services (Doroshenko et al., 2013). 
In the above we considered three types of contracts: (1) two with a fixed-fee to the 
private partner, conditioned either on the successful implementation of the project, or on the 
actual input if verifiable, and (2) with a performance-based remuneration to the private partner. 
All of them exist in the private sector and therefore are not specific to public-private cooperation. 
Moreover, the type of contracts alone cannot help distinguish public-private partnership from 
outsourcing (part of) public good provision through public procurement. Yet, complemented 
with provisions that ensure a reduction in the reservation utility and information and production 
costs, which are distinctive features of partnerships, they are able improve the allocation of 
resources. The latter justifies public-private partnerships from the perspective of improving 
social welfare. 
4. Examples 
The above three types of collaborative contracts between the public and the private 
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partners are quite common in practice. This framework explains examples of government 
buildings in the Netherlands (IC-type PPP contract) and roads construction in Finland 
(concession, PB-type contract) from the Introduction. Note that due to economies of scale, in 
large projects costs per unit are typically lower than in smaller projects. A building exemplifies a 
rather unique project of a smaller size than, for example, a highway. The input of the private 
partner can be relatively easily verified: the construction site is accessible, usually in an urban 
location, for which reason performing regular monitoring is not problematic. Architecturally, 
large buildings, especially in a central location, are rather unique, which implies relatively high 
production costs per unit of input. Therefore verification costs relative to the provision costs are 
rather low, and PB-contracts are less likely to be optimal. An IC-contract is more likely to be 
optimal for this type of projects, as public input is less specific, and the sensitivity of the 
outcome to it is rather low. In contrast, large-scale projects like motorways offer opportunities 
for a reduction in costs per unit through the economy of scale argument, and in particular 
through a rather routinized repetition of standard actions at each segment of the road. However 
the length of the project site makes private partner's inputs less observable, suggesting higher 
input verification costs. As predicted by the comparative statics in the previous section, 
concession is more likely to be optimal in this case. The same logic works in the cases below. 
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4.1. Performance-based contracts in waste management
3
 
Case 1: Energy from waste project in Suffolk, UK 
Description: 25-year, £1-billion private finance initiative (PFI) waste management 
contract between Suffolk County Council and SITA UK. Includes £185-million incinerator in 
Great Blakenham (Suffolk, UK), a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, with the capacity to 
burn up to 269,000 tonnes of residual waste a year and generate enough electricity for 30,000 
homes. [1] 
Public party contribution: The Great Blakenham site (in the ownership of the Suffolk 
Council) is on lease to the private partner for a peppercorn rent for the whole duration of the 
project, and will revert to the Council on expiry of the contract or earlier termination [3]. 
Minimum guaranteed tonnage (170,000 tonnes a year). Government grant of about £200 million 
over 25 years, to contribute towards the running costs [2] 
Private party contribution: finance, technology, building facilities, management. £180 
million Incinerator funded by SITA UK; at the end of the contract, the facility will be owned by 
Suffolk County Council [2]. Private party outsourced activities to other subcontractors, for 
example, architecture and design of the building to Grimshaw. 
Liabilities of the public party: payments for insufficient waste delivery; penalty if 
project plans withdrawn. Credibility of penalties is evidenced by a similar project in nearby 
                                                          
3
 Sources used: [1] Kane A. (2014) “Great Blakenham incinerator comes online”, Resource, 4 December 2014, 
available online at http://resource.co/article/great-blakenham-incinerator-comes-online-7008; [2] Suffolk Energy 
From Waste website, http://www.suffolkefw.co.uk/the-facility/facts-and-figures; [3] Suffolk County Council (2010) 
Final Business Case: Application for the private finance initiative credits, Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs Waste Infrastructure Delivery Programme, Suffolk Council Cabinet Meeting of 7 September 2010, 
Appendix A, available at http://committeeminutes.suffolkcc.gov.uk; [4] Suffolk County Council (2010) “Energy 
from waste project”, Scutiny committee meeting of 18 September 2013, Evidence Set 1, available at 
http://committeeminutes.suffolkcc.gov.uk; [5] SITA (2012) “Experience with EfW project procurement in UK”, 
available at http://www.ir-foundation.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/B2-Frederic-Aguesse.pdf. 
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Norfolk, initiated under the same conditions (and subject to the same government regulation), 
that has been withdrawn by the public party and resulted in penalties paid to the private partner 
(see example in Section 2.2). Minutes from the council’s meeting evidence discussions of the 
logistic schemes to enable meeting targets on waste delivery. The risk of not meeting the waste 
volume target is confirmed by estimates that “UK’s residual waste treatment capacity will 
exceed supply in 2017/18” [1]. 
Liabilities of the private party: penalties for broken deadlines, failure to meet 
standards; business risks, except for the risk of insufficient waste delivery. 
Sensitivity to contributions: First phase of the project (plant construction) is more 
sensitive to the contribution of the private party. The second phase (waste processing) is equally 
sensitive to contributions of both parties, as energy generation depends on the waste collection, 
as well as on the technology implemented and the quality of materials used in the construction of 
the waste processing facility.  
Optimal contract: PB-contract, because the sensitivity to both contributions is rather 
equal. Information costs are high (e.g. it is impossible to verify technology employed without 
specialized knowledge). If the first phase (plant construction) was unbundled from the second 
phase, a fixed-fee output-contingent contract would be optimal for the first phase as it is highly 
sensitive to the contribution of the private partner, and the information cost (verification of the 
quality of the plant) is high. Due to the high information cost at the first stage, bundling it with 
the second stage is optimal, as it removes at least one information verification stage, and 
introduces incentives for the operator to ensure the necessary quality of the facility. 
Actual contract: PB (concession). The private party derives profits from waste 
processing fees, depending on the amount of waste processed, as well as from energy generation. 
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The public party shares profit from energy generation (if exceeds target). 
Partnership element: close co-operation, as evidenced by minutes of the Council’s 
Scrutiny committee [4]. Assistance evidenced by the record-breaking short project approval 
time. The Council and the Community Liaison Group established by the Private Partner, jointly 
hold meetings with local community to update on progress and address issues arising. Although 
identification of the construction site is usually on the private partner [5], in this case the site was 
suggested by the Council from the beginning (and accepted by all four bidders at the 
procurement stage) [3]. The latter reduces risk of proposal being rejected on the basis of 
suboptimal choice of site (translates in the reduced reservation utility in the model). 
Evidence of success: CHP opened on time and on budget [1]. Architectural award for 
the building. Civil Engineering award for the overall project. [2] Successful operation scheme 
allowing to accommodate extra waste delivered from Norfolk after closure of several sites there. 
Average electricity generation 570 MWh per day (daily data available from 
http://www.suffolkefw.co.uk); this exceeds predicted energy generation of 225 MWh per day 
(converted from a figure of 80 000 MWh a year, [6]).  
Other remarks: the ownership of the facilities is transferred to the public party after 25 
years; associated risks (worn off facility, amortization costs, need in modernization) are on the 
public party. Budget forecasting does not go beyond 25 years, and does not consider these costs. 
 
Case 2: Waste processing in Krasnokamsk, Perm Krai, Russia
4
 
                                                          
4
 Sources used: [1] “Musornye Voiny: epizod vtoroi” (“Waste wars: episode 2“), Krasnokamskaya zvezda, 
29/06/2011, available online: http://media-office.ru/?go=353494&pass=0d6a1671b8ea281e5a5c42263bbb6610; [2] 
Bumatika official webpage http://new.bumatika.ru; [3] “V Permi zarabotal kompleks po avtomaticheskomu 
razdeleniu musora” (“Waste separation facility launched in Perm”, e-newspaper NeSekretno, 15/11/2013; available 
online http://www.nesekretno.ru/social/18155/v_permi_zarabotal_kompleks_po_avtomaticeskomu_razdeleniu_mus; 
[4] Glushkov A. (2013) “Est takaya professia – musor sortirovat” (“The profession to sort waste”), e-newspaper 
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Description: Solid household waste (SHW) processing at Bekryatinsk site 
(Krasnokamsk, Perm Krai, Russia). From 2008, the Bekryatinsk landfill site is under the 
management of the private partner «Bumatika», selected through a competitive procurement 
procedure. The initial contract is for 10 years. The waste management scheme includes a waste 
sorting facility launched in 2008 (the only one in Perm Krai at that time) and fully operating to 
day, with a capacity of 30 tonnes of SHW, capable of separating 18 fractions of SHW. Estimated 
investment value – RUR 38,5m (approximately £1m in 2008). Total planned investment – RUR 
100m. The size of the site –16,7ha. Apart from the sorting facility, the operator introduced 
modern technologies and equipment of waste compaction and ground densification, reducing 
water pollutions and simplifying future re-cultivation [1, 2]. In November 2013, Bumatika 
launched the second sorting facility, which is available to local university researchers for 
experimental studies in waste processing. Altogether, the project includes collection, 
transportation, storage, sorting and processing of SHW [3, 4].  
Public party contribution: land (peppercorn rent), monopoly waste processing right in 
the Krasnokamsk area (where the site is located), red-tape reduction, monitoring of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ProPerm.ru, 06/11/2013, available online: http://properm.ru/news/society/69365/ ; [5] “Bumatika: kompleksnyi 
podhod v ekologii” (“Bumatika: a complex approach in ecology”, Business Class, 27/06/2011, available online: 
http://vm1547.vps.agava.net/?go=2281733&pass=0cd5668fe7a83700c3f42c350872b367; [6] “Innovatsionnaya 
Bumatika” (“Innovative Bumatika”, Business Class, 10/10/201, available online:  
http://www.business-class.su/news/2010/10/11/76872; [7] Romanova A. (2012) «Musornyi Veter” (“Wind of 
waste”), Krasnokamskaia Zvezda, available online: 
http://www.raionka.perm.ru/krasnokamskaya-zvezda/?page=news&id=5214 ; [8] Bykova A. (2014) «Musornoe 
delo» («The Waste Business»), Zvezda Newspaper, 17/06/2014, available online: 
http://zwezda.perm.ru/newspaper/?pub=13635; [9] Shishkina O. (2014) “Nedohodnye othody” (“Unprofitable 
waste”), Metragi, 10(43), 52-55; [10] “Pusk mosorosortirovochnogo zavoda v Kransokamske otkladyvaetsia” (“The 
launch of the waste sorting facility in Kranokamsk delayed”, Business Class, 19/06/2008, available online: 
http://www.business-class.su/news/2008/06/19/12329; [11] Efremova (2011) “Prokurature ne udalos osporit…” 
(“The prosecutor’s office failed to challenge”), Kommersant-Prikamie, 11/01/2011, available online: 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1565579; [12] Zusman E. (2013) “Sudebnaya Praktika po koncessiam v regionah” 
(“The court practice on concessions in the regions”), presentation, VEGAS-LEX, Moscow, available online 
http://www.gosbook.ru/node/84273; [13] Suhanov V, and M. Strugov (2015) «Moskva poshla v othod» («Moscow 
is going to waste»), Kommersant-Prikamie, 07/03/2015, available online: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2682802. 
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ecological situation in the region. 
Private party contribution: finance, technology, facilities, maintenance, management. 
[5, 6] 
Liabilities of the public party: no evidence of formal liabilities (penalty sanctions) of 
the public party. Legal sanctions for improper usage of public (municipal) assets if property 
rights not clearly defined. Evidenced by court proceedings investigating the property rights and 
procedural regularities of setting the rental price in this case [7].   
Liabilities of the private party: regulatory sanctions if standards not met, business 
risks; penalty if project is not delivered; the public party has the right to terminate the contract. 
Sensitivity to contributions: the project is sensitive both to the private and to the public 
contribution. The private contribution ensures the quality of facilities, including environmental 
aspects, and partly the waste collection (apart from Bumatika, there are other collectors in the 
region who deliver waste to the processing facilities of Bumatika). The public contribution 
affects the amount of waste collected and processed [5, 8]. Unresolved issued with property 
rights and lease agreement caused a delay with the launch of the facilities [10].  
Optimal contract: PB-contract, because the sensitivity to both contributions is 
comparable and rather high. Information costs are relatively high (e.g. verification of timely 
waste collection).  
Actual contract: PB-type, similar to concession. The private party derives profits from 
waste processing fees, paid by other waste collecting companies, who are paid by households for 
the collection of waste. Additional profit is derived from sales of recyclable waste fractions. [11, 
12]. 
Partnership element: Assistance from the local administration in promoting separation 
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and collection of waste: subsidies to businesses that separate waste, popularisation of waste 
separation. The private partner confirms the local administration is interested in and contributes 
to achieving the objective of improved waste management in the region [9].  
Evidence of success: The project is still running. A second plant is launched in 2013. 
RUR 168m (£2.5m) reported revenue and RUR 2.4m (£34 000) net profit in 2013 [13].  
Other remarks: the lease agreement between Bumatika and the local authority expires 
in 2019. From 2014-15 there is a surge in the competition in the market for SHW processing in 
Perm Krai. This creates additional business risks. In 2015 Bumatika has been reportedly acquired 
by Eco-Systems (Moscow), a company that aims at a consolidation of smaller SHW processing 
enterprises in the Perm Krai [13].  
 
4.2. Fixed-fee contracts in traffic and road safety management
5
 
Case 1. Intelligent Traffic Systems in Essex (UK) 
Description: As of 2008, Essex had 7500 km of roads and 785,000 registered cars, 
travelling over 11 million vehicle kilometres annually. Traffic levels were estimated to grow by 
2% per year. County’s objectives were to improve the reliability of journey times for car users 
                                                          
5
 Sources used: [1] Siemens (2006) News release of 19 December 2006, available at 
http://www.siemens.co.uk/traffic/pool/documents/press_releases/2006/siemens_essex_contract_91206.pdf; [2] ECC 
(2006) “Summary Of Decisions Taken At The Meeting Of The Cabinet Held At County Hall, Chelmsford On 24 
October 2006”, Essex County Council; [3] Traffic Technology Today (2012) “SA2000 JV achieves 100% success”, 
published July 25, 2012, available at  http://www.traffictechnologytoday.com/news.php?NewsID=41380; [4] 
Siemens (2010) News release of 21 April 2010, available at 
http://www.siemens.co.uk/traffic/pool/documents/press_releases/2010/final_retrofit_programme_in_essex.pdf; [5] 
Burr R., L. Saville (2008) “Using ITS to deliver the network management duty of the traffic management act and 
improve journey time reliability for road users”, paper presented at the ITS World Congress, November 2008, New 
York, available at 
http://www.atkinsglobal.com/~/media/Files/A/Atkins-Global/Attachments/sectors/roads/library-docs/technical-journ
al-2/its-and-the-traffic-management-act.pdf; [7] ECC (2004) “Contract 2000 Review: Report by Cabinet Member 
for Highways and Transportation”, 27 January 2004; [8] ECC (2006) “Traffic Control and Information Systems 
Contract: Report to the Highways and Transportation Policy Development Group”, 16 March 2006. 
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(increase journey time reliability to 95%) and reduce average journey times (reduce journey 
times by 1% across the board) [5]. To achieve these objectives, a partnership contract SA2000 
between Siemens/Atkins and the Essex County Council (ECC) was signed in 2006 for the period 
until 2013 [1]. Although formally this contract was announced as starting in 2006, the actual start 
of the partnership dates back to 2000, when the initial contract with a total value of £7m was 
signed until 2013. Interruption and refreshment of the contract in 2006 is due to programme 
restructuring on the public side [2]. SA2000 manages the design, supply, installation, 
maintenance and operation of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) in Essex and is responsible for 
keeping traffic moving. [3]  
Public party contribution: At the pre-tender stage: funding, specification of needs: 
“…the development of the new contracts [needs to be] properly resourced and evaluated prior to 
going to tender. It is proposed, therefore, to establish a dedicated multi disciplinary team of staff 
to deliver the new contracts … some external resource will be required to support internal staff 
and it is proposed to secure experts from the industry to both provide advice and guidance, and 
also a resource to meet workload demands. This can be met from existing budgets. The intention 
is that that the wider industry and our existing partners will also be engaged in this process.” [7]  
At the post-tender stage: the county operates Essex Traffic Control Centre, involving 
Essex Police, Highways Agency, Regional and National Traffic Control Centre as stakeholders. 
The Centre is the main focus for congestion management: (1) acts as the control room for 
monitoring the network and implementing intervention strategies in response to planned and 
unplanned incidents, and (2) provides travel information and advice to the public relating to 
journey planning. Example of intervention includes changing timings on signal controlled 
junctions when they “lock up” due to heavy volumes of traffic. [5] 
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Private party contribution: Technology, installation, maintenance of equipment, data 
collection and processing.  
Liabilities of the public party: n/a.  
Liabilities of the private party: the contract can be terminated, as exemplified by the 
review of the original contract of 2000 in 2006 with a note that despite good partnership with 
contractors was formed, there is need for improved contract control and better financial 
management because “the added value expected from the “partnership” has not materialised to 
the extent expected” [7]. 
Sensitivity to contributions: High sensitivity to private input (equipment needs to 
properly work). High sensitivity to specifications of needs by the public party at the 
pre-tendering stage (wrong specifications result in underperformance) but relatively low 
sensitivity to public input (and low input) and post-tendering stages (although changes in public 
preferences post-tendering may result in contract termination).  
Optimal contract: fixed fee IC-type. The input of the private party (equipment installed 
and working) is verifiable at a relatively low cost. The input of the public party (Traffic control 
centre) to the overall objective of improving traffic and reducing accidents is less visible despite 
website with live data, radio broadcasting, as it also involves proper and quick response to 
congestions and accidents, which are more difficult to verify. 
Actual contract: IC-contract: “the payment mechanism is a combination of actual cost, 
tendered rates and time” [7].  
Partnership element: long-term relationship, involvement of the private party at the 
tender preparation stage (see the pre-tender public party contribution above), increased 
involvement of the public party at the post-tendering stage. “Siemens and Atkins work with the 
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council to develop a strategic plan to develop such technologies”. Contract not terminated 
despite programme restructuring. New “retrofit” programme to replace traffic signals with 
Siemens LED technology started in 2010 as a sign of continuing relationship [4]. Additional 
stimulus for the public party (ECC) through the Local Area Agreement (LAA) with the 
Department for Transport in 2006 to deliver improved journey time reliability across the Essex 
road network. This agreement included an element of pump-priming and, on successful 
achievement of the targets, significant reward funding of nearly £3m [5]. Maintenance cost on 
SA2000 contract reduced through on-road advertising by an additional agreement with Siemens 
[6]. “To ensure a strong partnership” regular meetings between the parties take place [7]. 
Evidence of success: 100% success against Operational Performance Indicators (OPIs) 
and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in 2011/12, up 27% since 2010/11. The OPIs and KPIs 
measure various factors, such as: delivery to time and budget; reducing congestion; and lowering 
the incidents of people being killed or seriously injured on the county’s roads [3]. 
Other remarks: The input of the public partner is unbundled from the private input; 
therefore the contract refers mainly to the contribution of the private partner. Generally, this 
creates risks of insufficient cooperation and low benefits from a partnership, which was the case 
at the first stage of the project, from 2000 to 2006. These risks were remedied by the developed 
relationship and improved incentives for the public partner. 
 
Case 2. Traffic and road safety management in Tula Region (Russia)
 6
 
                                                          
6
 Sources used: [1] Tender, project and selection documentation provided of the Regional Ministry for 
Transportation and Roads, http://transport.tularegion.ru/transp/konkurs/skd/; [2] Information agency Tula News,  
http://www.newstula.ru/fullnews_112661.html; Regional Ministry for Transportation and Roads of Tula Region, 
Press Release of 02/12/2015 . http://www.admportal.tula.ru/presscenter/press-release/press-release_22854.html; [4] 
Report of the Minister of Transportation and Roads of Tula Region, Alexander Kamzolov, to the meeting of the 
regional government on 07/12/2015, http://tulasmi.ru/news/216966.   
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Description: the local authority in Tula has formed a partnership with a private partner 
to develop, install, and service speed and red light cameras on roads. The objective of the project 
is to improve safety on roads by registering violations of the highway code. Through appropriate 
penalties on drivers, this should lead to a reduction of accidents and injuries. The project is for 
the period of 2014-2020, with a funding of RUR 475m (approximately £8m in 2014). The 
Regional Ministry for Transportation and Roads provides open access to all relevant 
documentation, from the call for proposals, tendering documentation to the protocols of the 
meetings to select the private partner. [1] 
Public party contribution: Identification of locations, putting in force legislative acts 
necessary to implement this project, coordination of the interaction of all parties involved, 
financing of the Operator (a special entity appointed to collaborate with and monitor the private 
party) [1]. The police department is responsible for the identification of drivers who violate the 
Code, and imposing penalties on them.  
Private party contribution: Finance, design, construction works, supply and 
installation of the equipment, servicing and maintenance [1]. 
Liabilities of the public party: “as specified by applicable laws” [1].  
Liabilities of the private party: Penalties: violation of the agreed overall deadline or 
termination of the agreement is fined per month of delay at a rate of 0.01% of the maximum 
amount of investment; delays with intermediate targets fined at RUR 30 000 (approximately 
£500) per day [1].  
Sensitivity to contributions: The project is sensitive to the quality of equipment 
supplied and its proper installation (private party contribution), which depend on the timely 
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approval of connections to electricity lines, coordination with municipalities and other parties 
involved (public party contribution). The overall objectives (safety on roads) are even more 
sensitive to the public input as failing to properly identify and impose fines on drivers violating 
the Code would significantly reduce the effectiveness of the system for the safety on roads.  
Optimal contract: IC-contract. The input of the private party (cameras installed and 
working) is verifiable at a lower cost than the input of the public party (using cameras to penalize 
speeding and dangerous manoeuvring on roads), IC-contract is also optimal even for higher 
levels of sensitivity of the project to the public input. 
Actual contract: Fixed-fee input-contingent (IC). The public party uses the system on 
lease from the private partner, with a buy-out of the system from the private party at the end of 
the lease agreement. If the system has to be dismantled due to road 
construction/extension/maintenance works, all expenses of the private party are paid in full. 
Partnership element: close cooperation. A special entity (Operator) is created to ensure 
day-to-day communication and decision-making. The parties agree to form a Commission to 
coordinate activities. 
Evidence of success: The system operates since 2014 with 33 elements running and 55 
installed by that time [2]. By 2015 all 90 elements were running [3]. In 2015, the Minister 
reported a reduction of the number of accidents by 12% as compared with 2014, which includes 
24 less people killed and 329 less people injured in traffic accidents [4]. 
Other remarks: Similarly to the previous case of Intelligent Traffic Systems in Essex 
(UK), the delivery of the system is unbundled from the public input (identification and 
prosecution of violations). The risks of insufficient cooperation are partly remedied by explicitly 
introducing an Operator for day-to-day decision-making and agreeing to form a Commission for 
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regular meetings. At the same time, the lease agreement contains the buy-out arrangement as an 
option for the public partner, which might have a positive effect on incentives for both parties. 
On the one hand, it creates risks for the private partner and incentives to raise the lease payments 
in order to lower the buy-out price. On the other hand, the private party is incentivized to 
demonstrate high quality and usefulness of the system, to ensure the buy-out option is realised by 
the public party, which, in turn has incentives for closer cooperation and monitoring under higher 
lease payments. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have based our considerations on the aspects of PPP that most definitions have in 
common: provision of public services and some form of cooperation between the state and the 
business. Our task was to specify this form of cooperation and the exact contribution of a 
partnership. To do this we have analyzed five possible forms of business organization (autarchy, 
private enterprise, public enterprise, controlled private enterprise and consolidated public-private 
enterprise) suitable for a production of public goods. A combination of this analysis with the 
review of commonalities in the existing approaches to PPP proved useful in deriving a 
generalized definition of a public-private partnership as a consolidated enterprise of the state and 
the private business in which a partnership principle holds: parties are interested in the success of 
their respective counterpart. Importantly, this alignment of interests is distinct from the incentive 
compatibility implied by contractual constraints. 
The above approach also proved useful in identifying the conditions under which a 
particular form of business organization dominates other forms in the provision of public goods. 
In presence of production costs individual production (autarchy) is strictly dominated by other 
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forms. A public enterprise is a dominant solution as long as managerial incentives within the 
enterprise guarantee internal efficiency. Otherwise a private enterprise is strictly preferred for 
efficiency reasons. In turn, this is dominated either by a regulated (controlled) private business to 
ensure consumer protection from excessive market power of privatized natural monopolies or by 
a PPP if monitoring cannot efficiently combat moral hazard. 
To elaborate this idea further and delimit the role of consolidation of resources and that 
of the partnership principle, we focused on public-private enterprises from a perspective of 
contracting. Consolidation of resources is a powerful mechanism that enables projects that would 
remain infeasible without such a cooperation between the public and the private sector. Social 
gains are due to relative cost advantages, yet some projects remain infeasible due to information 
frictions. Consolidation of resources can be achieved through standard contracts, like 
outsourcing on lease. There can be some gains from co-production, especially in terms of 
transaction cost reduction, yet the effect of a partnership is distinct. A partnership is built upon 
the willingness to support the counterpart, on top of contractual obligations embodied in the 
incentive compatibility constraints. Apart from reducing the information cost, it also creates 
other benefits like the red tape reduction, speed up in decision-making, and reputation gains. 
Although it can be argued that a reduction of information costs can be achieved through an 
improved co-production, the feasibility of the projects can be further improved in a partnership. 
Besides, a further reduction of information costs in a partnership as compared to consolidated 
enterprises, increases the social surplus thus making partnerships a dominating form of business 
organization. 
The forms, in which the partnership principle is implemented, can vary. Institutional 
arrangements that facilitate the projects that private businesses run with the public sector, 
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exemplify implicit provisions that embody the partnership principle. Explicit provisions would 
include special clauses in the contract. Typically, such a clause would specify the role of the 
public partner after the procurement stage, for example in what refers to risk sharing or possible 
modification/variation of the project specification. Although the optimal contract specifies a 
penalty on the public partner to ensure incentive compatibility, institutional environment (high 
credibility of the state) can rule out the need for such a penalty in the actual contract. 
We conclude with a remark on the apparent "agreement to disagree" on the definitions 
of the PPP. The disagreement mainly stems from the features embodied in the partnership 
principle, as we have formulated it. Yet, as we have shown, the partnership principle does not 
need to be specifically formulated in the agreement between the public and the private party. It 
turns out that in countries with a developed institutional structure that supports private-public 
cooperation, the benefits of the partnership are available to any consolidated private-public 
enterprise, which is then rightfully seen as a PPP. In particular, this implies that any contract that 
"by default" refers to a public-private cooperation, like a concession to provide public goods, 
should be regarded as a PPP. In other countries, just a consolidation of resources does not suffice 
to see the collaboration of the public and the private party as a true partnership, and hence more 
efficiency can be gained through an implementation of the partnership principle. 
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